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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
When officers responded to the scene of a reported shooting at an apartment, they found
Isaac Lyle Saldivar outside the apartment building.  Even though Mr. Saldivar cooperated with
the officers, and the officers never presented specific facts showing Mr. Saldivar was dangerous,
the officers handcuffed and frisked him.  The pat-down search of Mr. Saldivar revealed a firearm
on his person.  After the frisk, the officers checked for warrants and confirmed Mr. Saldivar had
an  outstanding  warrant  for  his  arrest.   At  the  time  of  the  frisk,  the  officers  did  not  know
Mr. Saldivar was on parole, or that he had agreed to a parole waiver of his constitutional rights
concerning searches.
The State charged Mr. Saldivar with felony unlawful possession of a firearm.  The district
court granted Mr. Saldivar’s motion to suppress, ruling the frisk was unreasonable and the
inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.  On appeal, the State argues the district court erred
when it granted Mr. Saldivar’s motion to suppress.  However, the district court’s decision to
grant the motion to suppress was correct.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
As  the  district  court  wrote  in  its  factual  findings  from  the  Order  Granting  Motion  to
Suppress, early one morning, “Boise City Police officers Joseph Martinez and Trent Schneider
responded to an apartment complex on [Shellie] Lane in Boise, based upon information that a
woman had been shot at that location.”  (See R., p.114.)  “Although later investigation would
reveal that the gunshot wound was self-inflicted, police did not know this at the time.”
(R.,  p.114.)   “The  police  only  knew that  the  apartment  was  the  scene  of  a  recent  shooting,  the
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occupants of the apartment were intoxicated, and the gun was still inside the apartment.”
(R.,  pp.114-15.)   “It  was  dark  when  the  police  arrived  and,  as  the  officers  approached  the
apartment building from the front, the defendant, Mr. Saldivar, came around the side of the
building, carrying a tote.”  (R., p.115.)
The district court found, “The officers ordered Mr. Saldivar to stop, show his hands, turn
around, and get down on his knees.”  (R., p.115.)  “Mr. Saldivar complied with all of these
commands.”   (R.,  p.115.)   “Officer  Schneider  handcuffed  Mr.  Saldivar  and,  after  Mr.  Saldivar
was handcuffed and on the ground, Officer Schneider patted down Mr. Saldivar for weapons.”
(R.,  p.115.)   “The  search  revealed  a  firearm  in  Mr.  Saldivar’s  front-left  pants  pocket.”
(R., p.115.)
According to the district court, there was no evidence presented at the motion to suppress
hearing  that  “Mr.  Saldivar  threatened  the  officers  or  challenged  the  officers  with  his  body
language,” or that he “reached for a weapon or exhibited any other furtive movements.”
(R., p.115.)  Moreover, “There was no evidence of any bulges or anything remarkable about
Mr. Saldivar’s clothing.”  (R., p.115.)  The district court found, “Although Officer Schneider was
responding to a call that had the potential to be dangerous, there was no evidence that
Officer Schneider considered this particular man to be dangerous.”  (R., p.115.)  “Indeed, the
evidence was to the contrary—that Officer Schneider patted down Mr. Saldivar as part of
standard operating procedure.”  (R., p.115.)
The  district  court  noted  that,  although Officer  Schneider  testified  at  the  hearing  that  he
patted  down  Mr.  Saldivar  “solely  based  on  officer  safety  concerns,  this  testimony  came  in
response to a leading question by the prosecuting attorney.”  (R., p.116; see Tr., p.16, Ls.5-24.)
“More importantly, Officer Schneider never testified that he had safety concerns about
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Mr. Saldivar specifically.  All the officer safety concerns expressed by Officer Schneider were
general concerns.”  (R., p.116.)
While the district court did not “doubt that Officer Schneider had officer safety
concerns,” the district court specifically found the officer’s testimony credible that
“Officer Schneider frisked Mr. Saldivar because it is standard operating procedure for the Boise
City Police Department to frisk anyone in handcuffs.”  (R., p.116.)  “After the pat-down search
of Mr. Saldivar, Officer Schneider checked for warrants and confirmed that Mr. Saldivar had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest.”  (R., p.116.)
The district court observed that, at the time of the frisk, “Mr. Saldivar was on parole and,
as a parolee, had signed a waiver, waiving his Fourth Amendment Rights.”  (R., p.116.)  The
waiver provided:  “I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property,
and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for which I am the controlling
authority  conducted  by  any  agent  of  IDOC  or  a  law  enforcement  officer.   I  hereby  waive  my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches.”
(R., pp.116-17; State’s Ex. 1, p.1.)  However, “Officer Schneider did not know that Mr. Saldivar
was on parole when he frisked him, nor did Officer Schneider know about the Fourth
Amendment waiver that Mr. Saldivar had signed.”  (R., p.117.)
The  State  charged  Mr.  Saldivar  by  Information  with  unlawful  possession  of  a  firearm,
felony, I.C. § 18-3316.  (R., pp.29-30.)  Mr. Saldivar entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.32.)
Mr. Saldivar subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order “suppressing
all evidence obtained as the result of an illegal seizure and/or illegal search as well [as]
statements made by Mr. Saldivar to law enforcement during custodial interrogations,” under “the
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Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  of  the  United  States  Constitution,  Article  I,  Section  17  of
the Idaho State Constitution, and I.C.R. 12.”  (R., p.49.)
Mr. Saldivar’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress asserted the officers’
detention and frisk of Mr. Saldivar was unlawful.  (R., pp.50-53.)  Mr. Saldivar asserted the facts
known to the officers at the time of the pat-down search did not meet the criteria for justifying
such a search from State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009).  (See R., p.51.)  He asserted that, when
the officers contacted him, the officers did not know if any weapons were still involved and did
not know his identity.  (See R., p.52.)  Mr. Saldivar had complied with the officers’ orders.  (See
R.,  p.52.)   He  asserted  that,  although “the  encounter  occurred  at  night  in  the  dark,”  the  record
was otherwise “devoid of evidence that support any of the other [Bishop] factors to be
considered.”  (R., p.52.)  Mr. Saldivar also asserted he “did nothing to indicate to the officers that
he may be armed or dangerous.”  (R., p.52.)  Thus, he asserted “the immediate detention, and pat
search of Mr. Saldivar’s person was unlawful.”  (See R., p.52.)  Mr. Saldivar concluded, “The
gun seized was a result of an illegal seizure and pat down for weapons and should be
suppressed.”  (R., p.52.)
Later, the State filed an Objection to Motion to Suppress.  (R., pp.71-78.)  The State
argued Mr. Saldivar “has a valid waiver of his constitutional rights as part of his conditions of
parole,” and he “lacks standing to object to a search because he has waived that right.”
(R., p.75.)  The State also contended, “even if the Court does find that the defendant’s waiver of
his rights is somehow inapplicable, Officer Schneider’s pat-search of the defendant for weapons
was reasonable given the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time.”  (R., p.76.)
The  State  argued,  “Based  on  the  totality  of  those  circumstances  which  were  known to  Officer
Schneider at the time he performed a minimally invasive pat-search of the defendant, it was
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objectively reasonable for Officer Schneider to believe that the defendant may pose a threat to
the Officer’s safety.”  (R., p.76.)
Further, the State argued that even if the pat search was not reasonable, “the attenuation
doctrine would prevent exclusion of the evidence because of . . . an unrelated intervening event.”
(See R., p.76.)  The State further argued, “the Court should not exclude the presence of the
firearm if there was a violation because the firearm would have been discovered inevitably.”
(R., p.77.)  The State requested that the district court deny the motion to suppress.  (R., p.77.)
Mr. Saldivar filed an affidavit averring he “was not presented with a warrant during my
encounter with police.”  (R., pp.94-95.)  At the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Officer Schneider testified.  (See R., pp.91-93.)  When the State asked Officer Schneider why he
conducted a pat-search on Mr. Saldivar, the officer replied, “It’s standard operating procedure for
anyone that is put in cuffs to make sure there are no knives and guns that could be pulled while
in cuffs.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-12.)  The State asked, “Did you do it for officer safety reasons?” and
Officer  Schneider  answered,  “Officer  safety  reasons  only,  yes.”   (Tr.,  p.16,  Ls.13-16.)   He
testified he was concerned about officer safety because “[t]here was a gun involved.  And any
other times someone is detained, we have officers walking around to make sure there are no guns
pulled on ourselves or others.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.16-21.)  Further, the officer was concerned that it
was dark out and he could not see clearly.  (See Tr., p.16, Ls.22-24.)
Mr. Saldivar’s parole officer also testified, and he confirmed Mr. Saldivar had agreed to
follow all the terms of supervision, including the term involving searches.  (See Tr., p.26, L.17 –
p.29, L.18.)  On cross-examination, Officer Schneider testified he did not recall discussing
Mr. Saldivar’s parole status at all.  (See Tr., p.22, Ls.17-21.)
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During the hearing, Mr. Saldivar’s counsel asserted with respect to the waiver, “In
regards to whether he had waived his right to be free from search and seizure at any time, and I
know that  it’s  a  fairly  broad  waiver  on  paper,  but  I  don’t  believe  anyone  had  any  information
about that when they made the encounter.”   (See Tr., p.33, Ls.15-20.)  Defense counsel asserted
the officers “didn’t rely on that as the purpose of it.  It was—the only real justification was just
kind of general officer safety.  And so I don’t believe that the Fourth Amendment waiver should
bar  Mr.  Saldivar  from  proceeding  [on]  a  motion  to  suppress  here.”   (Tr.,  p.33,  Ls.20-25.)
Mr. Saldivar’s counsel also asserted the waiver should not bar the motion to suppress in light of
Idaho’s exclusionary rule.  (See Tr., p.34, Ls.1-9.)
The district court asked Mr. Saldivar’s counsel for authority on the proposition that the
officers  not  knowing  about  the  waiver  would  affect  how  the  district  court  should  rule.   (See
Tr., p.35, L.15 – p.36, L.13, p.37, L.7 – p.38, L.2.)  The district court granted Mr. Salidvar
additional time to provide case citations on that topic.  (See Tr., p.39, Ls.16-18.)  The State then
argued the waiver was similar to the full waiver held to be valid in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841 (1987).  (See Tr., p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.12.)
The State filed a Supplemental Memorandum to the Court, arguing Mr. Saldivar did not
have standing to go forward on the motion to suppress.  (See R., pp.98-107.)  The State argued
Mr. Saldivar had no subjective expectation of privacy, because he had entirely waived his right
to be free from unreasonable searches.  (See R., pp.101-02.)  The State also argued Mr. Saldivar
did not have an expectation of privacy that society was willing to recognize as reasonable, based
on Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).  (See R., p.102.)  Further, the State contended
Mr. Saldivar’s waiver would be treated as consent to search under Idaho case law, and the search
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was within the scope of that consent.  (See R., pp.103-05 (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206
(2009); Gawron, 112 Idaho 841).)
Mr. Saldivar filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.108-12.)  He asserted, “an officer cannot rely on an unknown Fourth Amendment waiver
to uphold an otherwise illegal seizure, detention, stop or search.”  (R., pp.108-09.)  Mr. Saldivar
also asserted that, in Samson, “the [United States] Supreme Court reasoned that parolees have
even fewer expectations of privacy that probationers, but disavowed the proposition that
parolees, like prisoners, have no Fourth Amendment rights.”  (R., p.109.)  He asserted, “the
officers were unaware of the 4th Amendment waiver[] at the time of the search, and did not have
reason to believe the [suspect was] on probation or parole.  As such, Mr. Saldivar believes that
this Court should find that his waiver was ineffective as to the unlawful pat down.”  (R., p.111.)
The district court then issued its Order Granting Motion to Suppress.  (R., pp.114-24.)
The  district  court  ruled,  “Based  upon  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  confronting  Officer
Schneider,  a reasonable person would not conclude that Mr. Saldivar was armed and presently
dangerous.”   (R.,  p.118.)   Even  though  the  officers  “knew  that  Mr.  Saldivar  was  near  a
potentially dangerous crime scene,” and “[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime does
factor into the reasonableness inquiry . . . it does not by itself justify a frisk.”  (R., p.118 (citing
Bishop,  146  Idaho  at  819).)   Further,  Mr.  Saldivar  “complied  with  all  of  the  officers’
commands,” he “did not threaten the officers or engage in any behavior that caused the officers
concern,” and he “did not appear to have a weapon [and] did not engage in furtive movements.”
(R., p.119.)  Also, “There is no evidence that Mr. Saldivar appeared to be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.”  (R.,  p.119.)   The district  court  wrote,  “The officers did not testify that they
feared  for  their  safety  because  of  Mr.  Saldivar  or  his  words  or  actions;  rather,  any  safety
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concerns the officers had seem to have been based solely upon the nature of the call—that they
were responding to an apartment where a woman had been injured by a gun.”  (R., p.119.)
The district court highlighted that “Officer Schneider never testified that he believed that
Mr. Saldivar was armed and dangerous.”  (R., p.119.)  The district court was therefore “not in a
position of having to determine whether Officer Schneider possessed ‘specific and articulable
facts’ which justified the officer’s belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous.  There is no
evidence in the record that the officer believed Mr. Saldivar was armed and dangerous.”
(R., p.119.)  The district court ruled:  “Based upon a totality of the circumstances, including the
fact that these events took place at night, the pat-down of Mr. Saldivar was not justified and
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section
17 of the Idaho Constitution.”  (R., p.120.)
The district court then stated the consent to search in Mr. Saldivar’s “broad” waiver could
only mean one of two things:  either the State’s argument “that Mr. Saldivar waived his right to
challenge any search conducted by any law enforcement officer at any time; which is to say, that
Mr. Saldivar has no Fourth Amendment constitutional protections whatsoever and could, by
definition, never succeed on any motion to suppress,” or “it means something else.”  (R., p.120.)
The district court ruled, “the consent is not as broad as argued by the State and that the consent is
only valid if the law enforcement officers knew about it before conducting the search.”
(R., p.120.)  The district court adopted the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, which had held in Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2005), “that a
parolee waiver discovered post-search could not retroactively justify the search.”  (R., p.120.)
The Ninth Circuit had reasoned “that Fourth Amendment violations ‘almost without exception’
involve an ‘objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances
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then known to him.’”  (R., p.120 (quoting Moreno, 431 F.3d at 639).)  The district court ruled,
“A constitutionally defective search cannot be justified after the fact by information unknown to
the officer at the time of the search.”  (R., p.121 (citing State v. Donaldson, 108 A.3d 500, 505
(Md. Ct. App. 2015).)
Next, the district court ruled the attenuation doctrine did not apply.  (R., pp.121-22.)  The
district court also ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.  (See R., pp.122-23.)  The
district court characterized the State’s argument as being, “regardless of the frisk, routine
questioning by Officers Martinez and Schneider would have inevitably led to the discovery of
the warrant for Mr. Saldivar’s arrest.   According to the State’s speculative chronology, the
discovery of the warrant would have led to Mr. Saldivar’s arrest and a valid search incident to
that arrest.”  (R., pp.122-23.)  The district court ruled it “cannot adopt this position as it is based
solely upon speculation.”  (R., p.123.)  The district court noted, “The Idaho Court of Appeals
rejected similar arguments . . . .”  (R., p.123 (citing State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163-170 (Ct. App.
2011); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 393 (Ct. App. 1985).)  Thus, the district court concluded
“that the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant requirement does not apply here.”
(R., p.123.)
In sum, the district court held the warrantless frisk of Mr. Saldivar “violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution.  Because no exception to the exclusionary rule applies, Saldivar’s motion to
suppress is GRANTED.”  (R., p.123.)
The State filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order Granting Motion
to Suppress.  (R., pp.137-39.)
10
ISSUES
The State frames the issues on appeal as:
I. Did the district court err by concluding that Saldivar retained a privacy right despite his
parole status and waiver of his rights against police searches?
II. Did the district court err by concluding that the frisk of Saldivar was unreasonable despite
his presence at the scene of a shooting where officers believed a gun was still present?
III. Did the district court err by requiring an “additional line of inquiry” before the inevitable
discovery doctrine would apply?
Mr. Saldivar rephrases the issues on appeal as:
I. Was the district court correct in implicitly ruling Mr. Saldivar had the requisite legitimate
expectation of privacy to challenge the warrantless frisk of his person?
II. Did the district court correctly rule the warrantless frisk of Mr. Saldivar was
unreasonable,  where  Mr.  Saldivar  cooperated  with  the  officers  and  the  officers  never
presented specific facts showing Mr. Saldivar was dangerous?
III.  Did  the  district  court  correctly  rule  the  inevitable  discovery  doctrine  did  not  allow  the
admission of the evidence gained from the unlawful frisk of Mr. Saldivar, where the




The District Court Was Correct In Implicitly Ruling Mr. Saldivar Had The Requisite Legitimate
Expectation Of Privacy To Challenge The Warrantless Frisk Of His Person
A. Introduction
Mr. Saldivar asserts the district court was correct in implicitly ruling he had the requisite
legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge the warrantless frisk of his person.  The State
argues that, because of the parole waiver, Mr. Saldivar did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy,  otherwise  known as  “standing,”  to  challenge  the  frisk.   (See App. Br., pp.4-10.)  The
State contends:  “The state’s position in this case is not (nor has it ever been) that the search was
‘justified’ by the parole waiver.  Indeed the state stipulates (for purposes of this argument only)
that the search and seizure were not ‘justified’ by reasonable suspicion.”  (App. Br., p.7.)  “The
state’s only position is that [Mr.] Saldivar did not have a subjective expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as reasonable, and therefore could not assert that the rights he
specifically waived had been violated even if the officer’s conduct did not otherwise meet Fourth
Amendment standards.”  (App. Br., p.7.)
However, the State’s arguments on standing misunderstand the cases upon which the
State relies.  Those cases largely do not address whether a person has standing to challenge a
search.  The district court’s implicit ruling, that Mr. Saldivar had standing to challenge the
warrantless frisk of his person, was correct.
B. Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated.  An appellate court defers
to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
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the  trial  court’s  application  of  constitutional  principles  to  the  facts  as  found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution, provide protection against unreasonable searches.  U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.  “However, even if a search is unreasonable, a defendant must have a
privacy interest that was invaded by the search in order to suppress evidence discovered in the
search.” State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 41 (2017) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978)).  The term “standing,” in the context of motions to suppress, “is used as shorthand for the
question whether the moving party had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area that was
searched.” Id. at 39 n.1.  “When a search is challenged, the defendant bears the burden of
showing that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.” Id. at 41.
“That involves a two-part inquiry:  (1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008).
Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a search, and whether, after a defendant
has shown they have standing, a warrantless search was reasonable, are two separate issues.  “A
defendant attempting to suppress evidence obtained from a search must come forward with
evidence sufficient to show there was a Fourth Amendment search, she has standing to challenge
the search, and the search was illegal.  When the defendant challenges the illegality of the search
based upon the absence of a search warrant, the burden then shifts to the State to prove the
legality of the search.” State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162 (2000).  In other words, “once the
search  is  shown  to  have  been  made  without  a  warrant,  the  search  is  deemed  to  be  ‘per  se
unreasonable,’ and the burden shifts to the state to show that the search was pursuant to one of
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the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981)
(citation omitted).
C. The State’s Arguments On Standing Misunderstand The Cases Upon Which The State
Relies, Which Largely Do Not Address Standing
The State’s arguments on standing misunderstand the cases upon which the State relies.
The State, based on cases including Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and State v.
Gawron, 112 Idaho 841 (1987), contends Mr. Saldivar “did not have a subjectively held privacy
right that society would recognize as reasonable.”  (See App. Br., pp.5-6.)  However, the cases
upon which the State relies largely do not address whether a person has standing to challenge
a search.
Rather  than  address  standing  to  challenge  a  search, Samson and Gawron deal  with
whether a search was reasonable, after the burden shifted to the State to prove that.  The United
States Supreme Court in Samson concluded “that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
The Samson Court  framed  the  issue  as  “whether  a  condition  of  release  can  so  diminish  or
eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a
law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 847.  The Court
addressed that issue “under our general Fourth Amendment approach,” by examining “the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 848 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Whether a search is reasonable is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Samson Court held that, on the continuum of state-imposed punishments, “parolees
have fewer expectations of privacy that probationers, because parole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Id. at 850.  The Court, “[e]xamining the
totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a parolee . . . including the plain
terms of the parole search condition,” concluded “that petitioner did not have an expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.” Id. at 852.  The Court then held, “The
State’s interests, by contrast, are substantial.” Id. at 853.
Thus, when the Samson Court  concluded  the  petitioner  did  not  have  an  expectation  of
privacy that society would recognize as legitimate, it reached that conclusion in the context of
whether the search, balancing the petitioner’s privacy interest and the governmental supervisory
interests under the general Fourth Amendment approach, was reasonable. See id. at 848, 852-53.
The Court did not determine the petitioner lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
context of whether the petitioner had standing to challenge the search in the first place.  Further,
the Samson Court emphasized it was not equating “parolees with prisoners for the purpose of
concluding that parolees, like prisoners, have no Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at  850  n.2.
According to the Court:  “That view misperceives our holding.  If that were the basis of our
holding . . . there would have been no cause to resort to Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id.
Moreover, the Samson Court discussed how parolees have a “substantially diminished
expectation of privacy.” Id. at 855.  The Court also noted that, under California law, “an officer
would not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent knowledge that the person
stopped for the search is a parolee.” Id. at 856 n.5 (citing People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 505-
06 (Cal. 2003)).
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In sum, the State’s argument’s reliance on Samson is based on a misunderstanding of that
case.  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Samson is not itself a case about Fourth Amendment
standing,  and  it  does  not  purport  to  change  the  requisites  for  raising  a  challenge  to  a
substantively invalid search.” United States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2013).
The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Gawron is likewise not a case about standing.  In
Gawron, the Court held that persons “conditionally released to societies have a reduced
expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by governmental authorities ‘reasonable’
which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts.”
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843.  Although “[t]he scope of the search in the instant case well may have
exceeded the permissible limits announced in Chimel v. California, [395 U.S. 752 (1969)],” the
Court wrote that Chimel “acknowledged the existence of well recognized exceptions to the
general rule requiring a warrant in order to conduct a house search.  One of those exceptions set
forth in Katz v. United States, [389 U.S. 347 (1967)], is a search to which an individual
consents.” Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Gawron Court upheld the search at issue, based upon the probationer’s “consent to
warrantless searches.”1 Id.  In  other  words,  the Gawron Court held the search at issue was
reasonable based on consent as an exception to the warrant requirement, and did not decide the
probationer lacked standing to challenge the search.   Thus, the State’s arguments on standing
also misunderstand Gawron.
Two of the other cases relied upon by the State (see App. Br., pp.5, 7), also do not
address  standing  to  challenge  a  search.   The  United  States  Supreme  Court  in United States v.
1 In Samson, the United States Supreme Court stated that, “Because we find that the search at
issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach the
issue whether acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the . . . sense of a
complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3.
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Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), held the search of a probationer’s apartment was reasonable
“under our general Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of the circumstances,
with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206 (2009), held a probationer, by consenting to random evidentiary tests, also
impliedly consented to limited seizures of his person necessary for such searches. Purdum, 147
Idaho  at  210.   The Purdum Court, in light of Gawron,  discussed  the  probationer’s  consent  to
searches in the context of the consent exception to the warrant requirement. See id. at 208.
Neither Knights nor Purdum held the respective probationers in those cases lacked standing to
raise their challenges.
Even the case cited by the State that actually addresses a parolee’s standing to challenge a
search, (see Resp. Br., p.6), State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906 (Ct. App. 2007), does not support the
State’s argument that Mr. Saldivar lacked standing here.  The Idaho Court of Appeals in Cruz
held, “We agree that Cruz [the parolee] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
girlfriend’s apartment which he frequented regularly, either as a social guest or ‘part-time’
resident, and that he was therefore entitled to challenge the reasonableness of the search.” Cruz,
144 Idaho at 908.
In short, the State’s arguments on standing misunderstand the very cases upon which the
State relies.  Those cases largely do not address whether a person has standing to challenge
a search.  Because the State’s arguments on standing misunderstand Samson, Gawron, and the
other cases upon which the State relies, the State’s contention that Mr. Saldivar did not “prove he
had an expectation of privacy” (see App. Br., p.6.), fails.
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D. Mr.  Saldivar  Had  The  Requisite  Legitimate  Expectation  Of  Privacy  To  Challenge  The
Warrantless Frisk Of His Person, Because He Had A Subjective Expectation Of Privacy
That Society Was Willing To Recognize As Reasonable
By addressing whether the warrantless search here fit within an exception to the warrant
requirement (see R., pp.117-21), the district court implicitly ruled that Mr. Saldivar had standing
to challenge the search, see Holland, 135 Idaho at 162.  This implicit ruling by the district court
was  correct.   Mr.  Saldivar  had  the  requisite  legitimate  expectation  of  privacy  to  challenge  the
search, because he had a subjective expectation of privacy that society was willing to recognize
as reasonable.
First, there is no question that Mr. Saldivar had a subjective expectation of privacy in his
own person.  As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, “No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Terry  v.  Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); accord Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d
633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005).
Based on Terry, the Ninth Circuit in Moreno held, “there is no question that [a parolee]
had standing to challenge the search and seizure of his own person.” Moreno, 431 F.3d at 641.
The State contends, “The analysis of Moreno, that a parolee has the same privacy rights in his
person as a non-parolee, is directly contrary to precedent.”  (App. Br., p.7.)  However, the Ninth
Circuit in Moreno made no such holding.  Rather, the Moreno Court held that all it had said
“with respect to the necessity that the officers know of the existence of a warrant before they can
make an arrest pursuant to that warrant applies with equal force to a parole condition—an officer
must know of a detainee’s parole status before that person can be detained and searched pursuant
18
to a parole condition.” Moreno, 431 F.3d at 641. Moreno’s discussion of standing was not
contrary to cases like Samson and Gawron, considering those cases do not deal with standing.
The State further contends the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ decision in State v.
Donaldson, 108 A.3d 500 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015), is “similarly flawed.”  (See App. Br., p.7).
The Donaldson Court held, “a constitutionally defective search cannot be justified after the fact
by information unknown to the officer at  the time of the warrantless search.” Donaldson, 108
A.3d at 506.  But as the Donaldson Court explained, Samson does “not hold that an otherwise
unconstitutional search is authorized and beyond challenge on a motion to suppress if the police
discover after the arrest that the suspect was on parole.” Donaldson, 108 A.3d at 503.  In sum,
despite the State’s arguments to the contrary, Mr. Saldivar had a subjective expectation of
privacy in his own person. See Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626.
Second, Mr. Saldivar had an expectation of privacy society was willing to recognize as
reasonable.  As examined above, Samson “left open . . . the possibility that a parolee subject to a
search condition could challenge searches conducted by officers who lacked ‘knowledge that the
person stopped for the search is a parolee.’” See Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 975 (quoting Samson,
547 U.S. at 856 & n.5).  Because Samson contemplated parolees could challenge a search under
such circumstances, it follows such parolees (like Mr. Saldivar) would have an expectation of
privacy society was willing to recognize as reasonable, in order to have standing to challenge the
search. See Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626; see also Moreno, 431 F.3d at 641 (“[T]here is no question
that Moreno had standing to challenge the search and seizure of his own person.”); Cruz, 144
Idaho at 908 (“We agree that Cruz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s
apartment which he frequented regularly, either as a social guest or ‘part-time’ resident, and that
he was therefore entitled to challenge the reasonableness of the search.”).
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Thus, the district court’s implicit ruling, that Mr. Saldivar had the requisite legitimate
expectation of privacy to challenge the warrantless frisk of his person, was correct.  Mr. Saldivar
had a subjective expectation of privacy in his person, and society was willing to recognize that
expectation of privacy as reasonable.  The State’s arguments to the contrary misunderstand cases
like Samson and Gawron, which largely do not address standing at all.2  Mr.  Saldivar  had
standing to challenge the warrantless frisk.
II.
The District Court Correctly Ruled The Warrantless Frisk Of Mr. Saldivar Was Unreasonable,
Where Mr. Saldivar Cooperated With The Officers And The Officers Never Presented Specific
Facts Showing He Was Dangerous
A. Introduction
Mr. Saldivar asserts the district court correctly ruled the warrantless frisk of his person
was  unreasonable,  where  he  cooperated  with  the  officers  and  the  officers  never  presented
specific  facts  showing  he  was  dangerous.   The  State  argues,  “The  district  court  erred  when  it
concluded  that  more  was  required  to  stop  and  frisk  [Mr.]  Saldivar  than  suspicion  that
[Mr.] Saldivar was leaving a potential shooting scene where the gun was believed to be located.”
(App. Br., pp.15-16.)  However, the frisk of Mr. Saldivar was unlawful, because under the
totality of the circumstances here, a reasonable person would not conclude that Mr. Saldivar
posed a risk of danger.
2 The State has forfeited any argument on appeal that the warrantless search here was reasonable
because Mr. Saldivar consented to the search through the parole waiver.  As seen above, the
State argues, “The state’s position in this case is not (nor has it ever been) that the search was
‘justified’ by the parole waiver.”  (App. Br., p.7.)  Because the State thereby expressly eschewed
any argument on appeal that Mr. Saldivar’s consent through the parole waiver justified the
warrantless search, making the search reasonable, it has forfeited any future argument to that
effect. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763 (1993) (declining to address an issue the
appellant did not raise until the reply brief stage).
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B. Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
An appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are
clearly erroneous, and freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found. Hankey, 134 Idaho at 846.
“[T]o be reasonable a search must be authorized by a warrant that is based on probable
cause, unless one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.” State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 818 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).  “One such
exception is the pat-down search for weapons acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court
in Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)].” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818.  “Under Terry, an officer
may conduct a limited pat-down search, or frisk, ‘of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 30)
(citing Florida v. J.L., 539 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).  “Such a frisk is only justified when, at the
moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating
is ‘armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others’ and nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter dispels the officer’s belief.” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30).
“The test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of
danger.” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61 (2007)).  “To
satisfy this standard, the officer must indicate ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,’ in light of his or her experience, justify the
officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 818-19 (quoting
Henage,  143  Idaho  at  660).   “Although  an  officer  need  not  possess  absolute  certainty  that  an
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individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
“hunch”’ is not enough to justify a frisk.” Id. at 819 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
“Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would
conclude that a particular person was armed and dangerous.” Id.  “These factors include:
whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon; whether the
encounter took place late at night or in a high crime area; and whether the individual made
threatening or furtive movements, indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous
or agitated, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to
cooperate, or had a reputation for being dangerous.” Id.  “Whether any of these considerations,
taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62).
“For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer must demonstrate how the facts he or she
relied on in conducting the frisk support the conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.”
Id. (citing Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62).
C. The  State  Has  Failed  To  Show  That,  Under  The  Totality  Of  The  Circumstances,  A
Reasonably Prudent Person Would Be Justified In Concluding That Mr. Saldivar Posed A
Risk Of Danger
Here,  the  State  has  failed  to  show  that,  under  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that Mr. Saldivar posed a risk of
danger.  The State argues, “[g]iven the nature of the potential crime, the involvement of a gun
that was still at the scene, and [Mr.] Saldivar’s potential connection to the potential crime, the
gun, and the location, officers were justified in taking the reasonable approach of frisking
[Mr.] Saldivar.”  (App. Br., p.13.)
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The  State’s  argument  is  unavailing.   While  the  frisk  occurred  at  night  and  near  a
potentially dangerous crime scene (see R., pp.118-20), the totality of the circumstances does not
support  the  conclusion  Mr.  Saldivar  posed  a  risk  of  danger.   As  the  district  court  found,
Mr. Saldivar complied with all of the officers’ commands, did not threaten the officers or engage
in any behavior that caused the officers concerns, and did not appear to have a weapon.
(R., p.119.)  He did not engage in furtive movements, and there was no evidence he appeared to
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  (R., p.119.)  Although the district court found
Mr. Saldivar came around the side of the apartment building as the officers approached the
building from the front, the district court did not find they saw him actually leave the particular
apartment to which they were responding.  (See R., pp.114-15.)  The officers did not testify they
feared for their safety because of Mr. Saldivar or his words or actions, and their safety concerns
appear to have been based solely on the nature of the call—that they were responding to an
apartment where a woman had been injured by a gun.  (R., p.119.)
The totality of the circumstances here therefore presents important parallels with the
circumstances in Bishop and Henage, where the Idaho Supreme Court held the respective frisks
in those cases were unlawful. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819-21 (the subject did not make any
furtive movements, and there was no evidence that he appeared to be carrying a weapon or that
he was acting in a threatening manner); Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62 (the subject was
cooperative and polite, and did not make any furtive or suspicious movements).  Additionally,
the Bishop Court held the frisk there was unlawful even though the subject was acting nervous
and may have been under the influence of a narcotic, see Bishop, 146 Idaho at 820, a factor not
present here (see R., p.119).  Likewise, the Henage Court  held  that  frisk  was  unlawful  even
though the subject there admitted to carrying a knife, see Henage, 143 Idaho at 662, while
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Mr. Saldivar did not appear to be carrying a weapon (see R., p.119).  Thus, Bishop and Henage
strongly support the district court’s conclusion that a reasonable person would not conclude that
Mr. Saldivar was armed and presently dangerous at the time of the frisk.  (See R., p.118.)
Additionally, Henage supports the district court’s conclusion here because
Officer Schneider, much like the officer in Henage, did not particularize his general statement of
safety concerns to Mr. Saldivar.  The Henage Court held the district court’s finding that the
officer, Sergeant Baker, felt that his safety had been compromised was clearly erroneous. See
Henage, 143 Idaho at 662.  The Court held that finding was “flawed for two reasons—it is not
supported by Sgt. Baker’s testimony and it appears to be based on a subjective standard.” Id.
“The only evidence upon which the court could have based Sgt. Baker’s feeling that his safety
had been compromised was Jeremy’s [the subject’s] nervousness and the officer’s statement that
‘once a person tells me they’re in possession of a weapon, it compromises my safety.’” Id.
The Henage Court held, “this does not constitute the type of specific and articulable fact
necessary to justify initiating a search under Terry.  Sgt. Baker did not particularize this general
statement  to  Jeremy,  a  person  who  had  never  given  him  any  trouble,  and  he  testified  to  an
amiable, non-threatening consensual encounter.” Id.  The Court also held, “Weapons searches
are not justified by an officer’s subjective feeling, especially when that feeling is not
particularized to a particular individual in a specific fact situation.” Id.  “Rather, the court must
find that the officer has presented specific facts that can be objectively evaluated to support the
conclusion that the subject of the intended search posed a potential risk.  That is not the situation
here.” Id.
Nor  is  that  the  situation  in  this  case.   As  the  district  court  found,  the  officers  did  not
testify that they feared for their safety because of Mr. Saldivar or his words or actions, and any
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safety concerns the officers had seemed to have been based solely on the nature of the call.  (See
R., p.119.)  Indeed, Officer Schneider testified he frisked Mr. Saldivar because it was standard
operating procedure to frisk anyone who had been handcuffed.  (See R., p.116.)  The officer did
not particularize his general concerns about officer safety to Mr. Saldivar in this specific fact
situation.  (See R., p.116.)  Thus, as the district court indicated (see R., p.119), Officer Schneider
did not present specific facts that can be objectively evaluated to support the conclusion that
Mr. Saldivar posed a potential risk, see Henage, 143 Idaho at 662.
The  State  leans  more  on Bishop than Henage, contending Bishop “simply does not
support the district court’s holding that ‘[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime . . . does
not by itself justify a frisk.’  Rather, it stands for the proposition that a single factor may justify a
frisk.”  (App. Br., p.14 (quoting R., p.118).)  But this argument by the State neglects to mention
that the district court recognized, “[t]he totality of the circumstances determines whether these
factors,  either alone or jointly,  justify a search.”  (R.,  p.118 (citing Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819).)
Contrary to the State’s argument (see App. Br., p.13), the district court therefore did not apply an
incorrect  legal  standard.   Rather,  the  district  court  properly  considered  the  totality  of  the
circumstances and ruled they do not support the conclusion Mr. Saldivar posed a risk of danger.
Moreover, the State argues “the district court’s minimization of the nature of the
suspected crime is directly contrary to Idaho precedent.”  (App. Br., p.14.)  But the two cases
relied upon by the State do not actually support that proposition.
In the first case, State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1983), officers responded to a
late-night call from an alarm company, indicating a burglary was in progress at a bar. Burgess,
104 Idaho at 559.  The officers’ police cars were parked about four blocks from the bar, and
when the officers arrived at the scene, they saw the defendant walking across the parking lot
25
some twenty feet from the bar. Id.  The defendant provided his name and identification, and told
the officers he was walking to his girlfriend’s house from a restaurant. Id.  An officer noted the
defendant’s purported path would have taken him past where the officers had been, but when
asked, the defendant stated he had not seen any police cars parked along his route. Id.  After a
few minutes of further conversation, the officer frisked the defendant and found tools that could
be used to commit a burglary. See id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burgess held, “the police had reason to suspect that [the
defendant] may have been engaged in a burglary.” Id. at 561.  The officers “were investigating a
serious crime believed to be in progress; they found an individual at the scene of the crime at
3:00 a.m.; and the individual gave a questionable account of how he happened to be there.” Id.
The Court also observed, “It is not unreasonable to believe that burglars can be armed and
dangerous.” Id. at 561.  The Burgess Court held the delay of the frisk for a few minutes was not
in  itself  a  sufficient  basis  to  find  that  the  officer’s  reasonable  fear  for  his  safety  had  been
dispelled or that the search had become unreasonable. See id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in the other case cited by the State, In the Matter of Doe, 145
Idaho 980 (Ct. App. 2008), held that, “Although we decline to adopt a bright-line rule that
officers are automatically entitled to frisk every burglary suspect, we acknowledge that specific
circumstances combined with certain crimes like burglary make it much more likely that a
suspect will be armed and dangerous.” In re Doe, 145 Idaho at 983-84.  The officers in that case
had responded to a possible burglary call at night, at a church where officers had found three
individuals unlawfully inside the building a week prior. Id. at 984.  The Court continued:  “On
this occasion, when the officers arrived they found the two suspects walking quickly away from
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the church.  Both Doe and his friend were dressed all in black, indicating they may be trying to
avoid being seen.” Id.
Importantly, the In re Doe Court  noted  “that  factors  which  militate  against  a  frisk
discussed by our Supreme Court’s opinion in [Henage]—a known, cooperative individual with
no history of posing a danger toward the officer—are not present here.” Id. at 984 n.1.  Further,
the officer who frisked the other suspect “testified regarding the special risks associated with
investigating a possible burglary,” and the two suspects “could have been in possession of
burglary tools—screwdrivers, hammers, picks—that could easily have been used as weapons.”
Id. at 984.  Thus, the In re Doe Court concluded the frisk was justified based on the facts of that
case. Id.
There are salient differences between the facts here and those from Burgess and In re
Doe.  In contrast to the defendant in Burgess, who “gave a questionable account of how he
happened to be” at the crime scene, see Burgess, 104 Idaho at 560, there is no evidence
Mr. Saldivar attempted to deceive the officers before they handcuffed and frisked him (see
R., pp.116, 119).  Additionally, unlike the In re Doe suspect, see In re Doe, 145 Idaho at 984 n.1,
Mr. Saldivar cooperated with the officers (see R., pp.116, 119).  In view of those differences, the
district court’s examination of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the
reported crime, was not contrary to Idaho precedent. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819-21; Henage,
143 Idaho at 660-61.
The  State  has  failed  to  show that,  under  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  a  reasonably
prudent person would be justified in concluding that Mr. Saldivar posed a risk of danger.  The
frisk of Mr. Saldivar was therefore unlawful. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821; Henage, 143 Idaho
at 662.  The district court correctly ruled the warrantless frisk of Mr. Saldivar was unreasonable,
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where he cooperated with the officers and the officers never presented specific facts showing he
was dangerous.
III.
The District Court Correctly Ruled The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Did Not Allow The
Admission Of The Evidence Gained From The Unlawful Frisk Of Mr. Saldivar, Where The
District Court Used The Proper Legal Standard
A. Introduction
Mr. Saldivar asserts the district court correctly ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did
not allow the admission of the evidence gained from the unlawful frisk of Mr. Saldivar,  where
the district court used the proper legal standard.  The State argues the district court erred when it
ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply, by applying an incorrect legal standard.3
(App. Br., p.16.)  Specifically, the State contends the district court, citing State v. Liechty, 152
Idaho 163, 170 (Ct. App. 2011), incorrectly concluded “the state did not prove ‘that some
additional line of investigation would have inevitably resulted in the evidence being
discovered.’”  (See App. Br., p.18.)  However, the district court actually used the proper legal
3 On  appeal,  the  State  “does  not  challenge  the  district  court’s  ultimate  conclusion  that  the
attenuation doctrine does not apply.”  (App. Br., p.17 n.3.)
While the State disputes the district court’s factual finding on attenuation that “the officer
testified that it was ‘standard operating procedure’ to frisk ‘anyone that is put in cuffs’” (see
App. Br., p.17 n.3 (quoting R., pp.116, 122)), the State has not shown this finding was clearly
erroneous.  Officer Schneider testified, “Due to the nature of our call and not knowing what we
had and coming from the same complex, we asked [Mr. Saldivar] to get on the ground and
detained him for identification purposes.”  (Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.16, L.4.)  Contrary to the State’s
argument  (see App. Br., p.17 n.3), the officer did not testify on direct examination that he
handcuffed Mr. Saldivar out of concerns for officer safety.  Rather, Officer Schneider only
testified he conducted the frisk because of general officer safety reasons.  (See Tr., p.16, Ls.5-
21.)  Indeed, when the State asked Officer Schneider why he conducted a pat-search of
Mr. Saldivar, the officer replied, “It’s standard operating procedure for anyone that is put in cuffs
to make sure there are no knives and guns that could be pulled while in cuffs.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-
12.)  Thus, there was ample factual support for the district court’s conclusion that the standard
operating procedure was in purposeful and flagrant disregard of the law.  (See R., p.122.)
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standard.  Under the proper legal standard, because the officers’ discovery of the warrant here
flowed directly from the officers’ unlawful conduct, the district court correctly ruled the
inevitable  discovery  doctrine  did  not  allow  the  admission  of  the  evidence  gained  from  the
unlawful frisk.
B. Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
An appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are
clearly erroneous, and freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found. Hankey, 134 Idaho at 846.
Evidence obtained in violation of the United States and Idaho constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 515-19 (2012); Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 810-11.  This exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal
government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality,
or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.  However, there are various
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).
“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into
the lawful actions law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful
avenue that led to the evidence.” State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, ___, 407 P.3d 1285, 1290
(2017) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stuart v.
State, 136 Idaho 490, 497 (2001)).  “The premise is that law enforcement should be in ‘the same,
not a worse, position that they would have been’ absent the misconduct.” Id. 407 P.3d at 1290
(quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (majority opinion)).  “The doctrine must presuppose inevitable
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hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the
officers’ unlawful conduct.” Id. at ___, 407 P.3d at 1291.
C. The District Court Used The Proper Legal Standard When It Ruled The Inevitable
Discovery Doctrine Did Not Apply
The district court used the proper legal standard when it ruled the inevitable discovery
doctrine did not apply.  The district court did not apply an incorrect standard as the State argues
(see App. Br., pp.16, 18), because Liechty is in accord with the later Downing and Rowland
decisions.  The Liechty Court quoted the Idaho Court of Appeals’ earlier description of the
doctrine from State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 391-92 (Ct. App. 1985). Liechty, 152 Idaho at
171.  The Liechty Court held, “As discussed by this Court in Holman,  the  issue  before  us  is
whether an additional line of investigation would have revealed the methamphetamine . . . .  The
record does not disclose any additional line of investigation and, as a result, the inevitable
discovery doctrine does not apply.” Id.
The holding in Liechty accords with Downing and Rowland.  The Idaho Court of Appeals
in Rowland held, “Although those lawful means need not be the result of a wholly independent
investigation, they must be the result of some action that actually took place (or was in the
process of taking place) that would inevitably have led to the discovery of the unlawfully
obtained evidence.” Rowland, 158 Idaho at 787.  The language about an “additional line of
investigation” from Liechty, rather than describing “a wholly independent investigation,”
encompasses the “some action that actually took place (or was in the process of taking place)”
language from Rowland.   Similarly,  the  Idaho  Supreme Court  in Downing held, “The doctrine
must presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions,” i.e.,
additional lines of investigation. See Downing, 163 Idaho at ___, 407 P.3d at 1291.
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Additionally, both Downing and Rowland quote from Holman, 109 Idaho at 392, the
source of the inevitable discovery doctrine’s description in Liechty, for the following
proposition:  “The inevitable discovery doctrine is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule
whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.” See Downing,
163 Idaho at ___, 407 P.3d at 1291 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); Rowland,
352 P.3d at 509-10.
Liechty is actually in accord with later inevitable discovery doctrine cases, such as
Downing and Rowland,  and  thus  the  State’s  argument  that  the  district  court  used  an  incorrect
legal standard fails.
D. Because The Officers’ Discovery Of The Warrant Flowed Directly From Their Unlawful
Conduct, The District Court Correctly Ruled The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Did Not
Allow The Admission Of The Evidence Gained From The Unlawful Frisk
Because the officers’ discovery of the warrant here flowed directly from their unlawful
conduct, the district court correctly ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did not allow the
admission of the evidence gained from the unlawful frisk.  The State argues the inevitable
discovery doctrine should apply here “[b]ecause the warrants check, discovery of the warrant,
and arrest thereon were police actions that in fact took place without regard for the frisk, and a
search incident to the warranted arrest would have discovered the gun.”  (See App. Br., p.19.)
The State’s argument ignores the district court’s finding that the warrants check came
after the warrantless frisk and discovery of the gun.  (See R., p.116.)  Thus, the warrants check
here flowed directly from the officers’ unlawful conduct. See Downing, 163 Idaho at ___, 407
P.3d at 1291.  There were no “inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions,”
see id. 407 P.3d at 1291; in other words, there were no lawful means that were “the result of
some action that actually took place (or was in the process of taking place) that would inevitably
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have led to the discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence,” see State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho
784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015).  Unlike the parallel search already underway in Nix, see 467 U.S. at
442-43, there were no actions already being undertaken by the officers here that would have
inevitably led to the discovery of the warrant.
The State argues, “The facts of this case show that the gun would have been discovered
in a valid search incident to arrest but for it having been previously found in the frisk.”  (App.
Br., p.18.)  However, that argument relies on speculation on the course of action the investigation
could have taken absent the unlawful conduct.  The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that approach
in Downing, holding, “The inevitable discovery exception does not permit us to speculate on the
course of action the investigation could have taken in the absence of pre-Miranda statements, an
unlawful pat-search, and subsequently tainted admissions—even if that alternate course likely
would have yielded the evidence.” See Downing, 163 Idaho at ___, 407 P.3d at 1291.  The
exception likewise does not permit the State’s speculation on the course of action the
investigation could have taken in the absence of the unlawful frisk of Mr. Saldivar.
In other words, the State’s argument would improperly substitute what the police should
have done for what they really did. See Holman, 109 Idaho at 392.  The district court found,
“After the pat-down search of Mr. Saldivar, Officer Schneider checked for warrants and
confirmed  that  Mr.  Saldivar  had  an  outstanding  warrant  for  his  arrest.”   (R.,  p.116.)   As
examined above, Idaho’s appellate courts have held:  “The inevitable discovery doctrine is not
intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have
done for what they really did.” Downing, 163 Idaho at ___, 407 P.3d at 1291 (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted); Rowland, 352 P.3d at 509-10.  The State’s speculation on
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what the officers could have done is exactly the kind of substitution our appellate courts have
roundly rejected.
The State has failed to show the inevitable discovery doctrine applies here. The district
court used the proper legal standard when it ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.
Because the discovery of the warrant flowed directly from the officers’ unlawful conduct, the
district court correctly ruled the inevitable discovery doctrine did not allow the admission of the
evidence gained from the unlawful frisk of Mr. Saldivar.
CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  Mr.  Saldivar  respectfully  requests  that  this  Court  affirm  the
district court’s order granting his motion to suppress.
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